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ABSTRACT
The issuance of debt is a monitoring mechanism. Whether the debt is from a private lender or is in the 
form of publicly traded bonds, both types of lenders expect a return on their money (Jensen, 1986). 
Thus, while finding ways to increase sales is important, the control of expenses is paramount to the 
success of the firm and to be able to borrow more funds in future. Using data from 111 restaurant 
firms for the 2009– 2018 period, this study examines whether the use of debt by U.S. restaurant com-
panies is an effective monitoring agent and if it helps firm performance. Results reveal a significant 
relationship between a restaurant firm’s expense ratio and its short- term, long- term, and total debt 
ratios after controlling for firm size, economic cycles, and franchising. As such, the phenomenon of 
debt relevance in the restaurant sector is better understood.
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Introduction
The purpose of this research is to understand if the 
use of debt by U.S. restaurant companies is an effec-
tive monitoring agent and if it helps firm perfor-
mance. The restaurant industry has a reputation for 
being risky. Risk factors include few barriers to entry, 
relatively high failure rates, and significant reliance 
on the managerial skill set (Parsa et al., 2005; Dalbor 
et al., 2014). This is particularly true for an industry 
with a large number of locations operated by local 
franchisees.
According to Ralmer (2018), restaurant profit 
margins vary widely (from 0 to 15 percent), but 
the average is only 3 to 5 percent. The basic solu-
tions to increasing profitability are increasing sales, 
reducing expenses, or both. Most of the effort lies in 
controlling three large expenses: cost of goods sold, 
labor, and overhead. A variety of subcategories exist 
within those expenses.
The marketplace recognizes the significance of 
controlling cost of goods sold and labor in partic-
ular given that these are generally the two highest 
costs of doing business in the restaurant industry. In 
addition to low profit margins, borrowed funds are 
somewhat hard to acquire for smaller, independent 
restaurant firms. The use of borrowed funds is one 
way to increase the amount of assets under manage-
ment so that independent restaurant firms can grow 
into national or multinational firms like Brinker and 
Chipotle.
As discussed by Jensen (1986), the issuance 
of debt is a monitoring mechanism. However, it 
may also be a signaling mechanism. Regardless of 
whether the debt is from a private lender or is in the 
form of publicly traded bonds, both types of lenders 
expect a return on their money and at a minimum, 
repayment from the firm. Thus, while finding ways 
to increase sales is important (particularly growth 
in same store sales for restaurant chains), the con-
trol of expenses is paramount to the success of the 
firm and to be able to borrow more funds in the 
future. As explained in the literature review (Jensen, 
1986), borrowed funds may not be the first choice 
of restaurant firms, but it certainly has some advan-
tages to the borrower.
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Therefore, this paper attempts to answer the fol-
lowing research question: Are restaurant firms that 
use borrowed funds more efficient at controlling 
operational expenses?
The following section will discuss the relevant hos-
pitality literature regarding capital structure and the 
use of debt. The data obtained and the methodology 
employed will be discussed. The results of the statis-
tical analysis will be subsequently presented. Con-
clusions and recommendations for future research 
are provided in the final sections of the paper.
Literature Review
Pecking Order Theory
The notion of the use of debt as a monitoring agent 
emanates from capital structure theory. Initial work 
by researchers such as Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
focuses on the appropriate amount of debt to be 
included in a firm’s capital structure. Their argu-
ment largely revolves around the tradeoff theory in 
which the optimal amount of debt is based on the 
tax deductibility of the interest payments.
Capital structure theory evolved from attempt-
ing to determine the optimal amount of debt for 
the firm into trying to determine why debt is used. 
For most firms, debt is one component in the capital 
structure of the firm.
One of the first theories of capital structure is the 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1977; 1984; 2001). 
Under this theory, there are three major choices of 
financing: internal equity, outside debt, and new 
external equity. The order of these financing choices 
is in line with their costliness. Internal equity is the 
least costly because of the lack of issuance costs 
(although it required firms to maintain profitabil-
ity). Debt falls in the middle because while there 
are new issuance costs, the interest payments on 
debt service are tax deductible. Finally, new exter-
nal equity requires due diligence prior to issuance, 
and dividend payments to shareholders are not tax 
deductible.
Debt as a monitoring agent
The focus of this paper is the use of debt as a mon-
itoring mechanism as outlined by Jensen (1986). 
According to Jensen, managers have an incentive to 
grow the firm beyond its optimal size. This is because 
managers are often rewarded for the amount of 
assets under their management.
Jensen’s work involves the notion of “free cash 
flow” (FCF). FCF is defined as cash flow in excess of 
what is needed to fund all projects with positive net 
present values. In order to help prevent such actions, 
firms take on debt to help reduce these agency costs. 
Debt service payments can even be a better control 
mechanism than dividends. This is because dividends 
are “weak promises” that can be cut in the future. 
More often than not the market punishes dividend 
cuts as an acknowledgment of the FCF hypothesis.
Jensen cites work by Smith (1986) that indicates 
that leverage- increasing transactions lead to signif-
icant and nearly immediate stock price increases 
while leverage- reducing transactions have the oppo-
site effect. This finding appears to support the notion 
that firms who take on financial leverage (i.e., debt) 
better produce profits and or cash flows, thus being 
more effective or efficient. The market appears to 
recognize the value of debt as a monitoring agent to 
control expenses and the overinvestment problem.
Although underinvestment is mentioned as an 
agency problem in capital structure research, it is 
not merely a hypothetical scenario. Jensen (1986) 
studied oil industry practices from 1984. He finds 
that the 10 largest oil companies had cash flows of 
approximately $50 billion, nearly 30% of the total 
cash flows from the top 200 firms in the United 
States. They did not return these large cash flows to 
shareholders in the form of increased dividends but 
instead continued to invest in development proj-
ects with returns below the cost of capital. Thus, it 
appears the need for monitoring is an actual real- 
world concern.
Potential factors impacting restaurant expenses
In a study of Texas restaurants by English, Josiam, 
Upchurch, and Willems (1996), they find that corpo-
rate and/or franchise restaurant operators definitely 
have a competitive edge in the marketplace. Size is 
a critical factor in restaurant firm success because 
large operations can achieve economies of scale 
regarding operational costs (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). 
Moreover, firms that have franchise locations utilize 
local operators who cannot only take advantage of 
scale economies but also make use of trade names 
(Hua & Dalbor, 2013; Litz & Stewart, 1998). Size and 
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franchising are also important factors in mitigating 
restaurant failure (Parsa et al., 2005; Self et al., 2015) 
and serve as a tool for future growth (Roh, 2002).
Perhaps the most prominent studies on restaurant 
failures are those completed by Parsa et al. (2005) 
and the follow- up study by Parsa, Self, Sydnor- Busso, 
and Yoon (2011). These studies indicate a wide vari-
ety of causes of restaurant failure. However, they 
place the causes into two major categories: internal 
and external factors. Internal factors include items 
such as industry experience, management skills, and 
planning (or lack thereof). External factors include 
things like location, competition and availability of 
financing. While they generally conclude that inter-
nal factors make the greatest contribution to failure, 
external factors definitely play a role and cannot be 
ignored. Thus, one could argue that, in general, eco-
nomic conditions have an impact on the develop-
ment of new competition (or the survival of existing 
competition), availability of financing, and changes 
in customer demand. While economic conditions 
are often used by management as a ready- made 
excuse for poor performance, declining economic 
conditions may not be a cause of failure but yet can 
have a negative impact on restaurant firm perfor-
mance and/or expense management.
Research hypothesis
Based upon the literature reviewed, we propose the 
following research hypothesis: restaurant firms that 
take on debt have improved operating efficiency. To 
be specific, debt ratios are negatively correlated with 
operating expenses ratios. We will subsequently 
examine the relationship between operating expense 
ratios and the following variables: debt ratios, firm 
size, franchising, and economic conditions. The next 
section will describe the data used and methodology 
employed to answer the research question.
Methodology
Sample
Ten years of data from Compustat (2009– 2018) 
were used in this study. The selection of data was 
based mainly on data availability, the reliability of 
data sources, and the ability to quantify variables in 
the modeling process. Standardized difference of fit 
value (SDF), standardized difference in beta value 
(SDB), Cook’s distances, and case wise analysis were 
conducted to detect outliers. After removing outli-
ers, a total of 111 restaurants with 752 restaurant- 
year observations were included in the sample and 
used for the analysis.
Variables
Dependent variables
The dependent variables of interest in this study 
are the percentage of various operating expenses 
to total revenue (REVT). This includes advertising 
expense (XAD), administrative and general expense 
(XAGT), equipment and occupation expense 
(XEQO), total operating expenses (XOPR) and total 
expenses excluding interest expenses (XT— XINT).
Independent variables
The independent variables (IVs) are the debt ratios 
relative to total assets (AT). This includes debt in 
current liabilities (DLC), long- term debt (DLTT), 
and total liabilities (LT). A control variable for size 
(the natural log of total assets) is also used. Dummy 
variables for franchising (1 if the firm has franchise 
locations) and economic conditions (1 for recession 
years) will be included. As a result, the relationship 
between capital expenditures in the U.S. restaurant 
industry and the determinants is stated as:
 ExpRatit = a0 + a1DebtRatit + a2Sizeit  
 + a3 Frait + a4Ecoit + ei (1)
Where:
ExpRatit = Ratio of operating expenses 
(advertising, administrative and general, 
equipment and occupancy, and operating 
excluding interest expenses) to total revenue 
for firm i in year t;
DebtRatit = Three separate debt ratios will be 
used in the regressions: the ratio of short- term 
debt, long- term debt, and total debt to total 
assets for firm i in year t;
Sizeit = Restaurant size (the natural log of total 
assets) for firm i in year t;
Frait = Franchising or not for firm i in year t (0 = 
not franchising, 1 = franchising);
Ecoit = Economic conditions in year t (1 = 
economic recession year, 0 = otherwise);
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ei = the error term of the regression;
t = years 2009 through 2018.
Assumptions Check for Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to run the multiple regression analysis prop-
erly, several assumptions were examined. First, the 
linearity and multicollinearity (tolerance value and 
variance inflation factor) of the relationship between 
the dependent variables and the independent vari-
ables were examined through residual plots; second, 
heteroscedasticity was checked through a statistical 
diagnosis to make sure there was no assumption 
violations for the presence of unequal variances; 
third, independence of the error terms was exam-
ined to ensure each predicted value is independent; 
last, normal probability plots were used to check 
the normality of the error term distribution. All 
assumptions were met, and we determined that the 
data is appropriate for analysis.
Results
Summary statistics of key variables are reported in 
Table 1. The final sample consists of 752 restaurant 
firm- year observations from 2009 to 2018. As can 
be seen from Table 1, Operating Expenses Ratio 
(ExpRat) ranged from – 0.431 to 5.845, with an aver-
age of 0.858; the means of the three Debt Ratios were 
0.049, 0.333, and 0.724, respectively. Eighty- five per-
cent of the restaurants in the sample were franchised 
(mean = 0.85).
Pearson correlation analysis results are provided 
in Table 2. All independent variables but franchis-
ing were significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable.
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Sample
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ExpRat 752 0.859 0.312 – 0.431 5.845
DebtRat1 752 0.049 0.170 0 2.500
DebtRat2 752 0.333 0.437 0 3.852
DebtRat3 752 0.724 0.581 0 6.154
Size 752 2.518 0.885 – 0.339 4.579
Fra 752 0.85 0.358 0 1
Eco 752 0.1 0.300 0 1
Table 1 details the summary statistics for the sample. ExpRat is the ratio of operating expenses to total revenue. DebtRat1 is the ratio of 
short- term debt to total assets. DebtRat2 is the ratio of long- term debt to total assets. DebtRat3 is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Size is the natural log of total assets. Fra is an indicator variable with 0 for firms with no franchising and 1 for firms that franchise. Eco is an 
economic condition indicator variable where it is 1 if the data was from 2009, 0 otherwise.
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 752)


















































P- values are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
Table 2 contains the Pearson correlation analysis statistics for the sample. ExpRat is the ratio of operating expenses to total revenue. 
DebtRat1 is the ratio of short- term debt to total assets. DebtRat2 is the ratio of long- term debt to total assets. DebtRat3 is the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Fra is an indicator variable with 0 for firms with no franchising and 1 for firms that 
franchise. Eco is an economic condition indicator variable where it is 1 if the data was from 2009, 0 otherwise.
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To assess the effect of debt on a number of dif-
ferent operating expenses, three debt- to- asset ratios 
were included in the stepwise regression analysis. 
Multicollinearity was assessed, and the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) ranged from 1.002 to 1.182, 
and tolerance value ranged from 0.846 to 0.998, 
suggesting there is neither collinearity nor multi-
collinearity. In Table 3, unstandardized coefficients 
(B), standard error of unstandardized coefficients 
(SE B), standardized coefficients (β), and t statistic 
(t) are reported.
As shown in Table 3, the linear regression results 
showed that all independent variables were statis-
tically significant. To be specific, all three debt- to- 
asset ratios and size were negatively correlated with 
the operating expenses ratio; meanwhile, franchising 
status was positively correlated with the operating 
expenses ratio. The results suggested that the higher 
the debt ratio, the lower the operating expenses 
ratio, which results in higher profits. The results also 
suggested that franchising a restaurant tends to gen-
erate higher operating expenses, but this may not 
suggest practical meaning given that the majority of 
the sample were franchised restaurants.
The economic conditions variable was not signifi-
cant in any of the models and was removed from the 
final overall model.
Conclusions and Discussion
The purpose of this research is to understand if the 
use of debt by U.S. restaurant companies is an effec-
tive monitoring agent and if it helps firm perfor-
mance. What follows is a discussion of each of the 
factors we examined.
The short- term debt ratio (DebtRat1) showed 
a significantly negative relationship with expense 
ratios. This may be because if firms attempt to match 
assets with liabilities, short- term debt could be help-
ing to manage day- to- day operations more effec-
tively. Obtaining short- term financing is important 
to restaurant firms in order to manage important 
items such as inventory and payroll. Given the noto-
riously low profit margins of most restaurant firms, 
controlling expenses is an important signal to short- 
term lenders to be able to have continued access to 
capital to remain in business.
The long- term debt ratio (DebtRat2) was also sig-
nificant and negatively related to operating expense 
ratios. Once again, if liabilities are being matched 
with assets, it could be that long- term debt is being 
used to finance long- term assets that may make an 
operation more efficient (i.e., newer equipment). 
Although restaurant firms are not as fixed asset 
intensive as other hospitality firms (such as hotels 
and/or casinos), many restaurant firms make long- 
term investments in land and buildings. Given that 
the success of many firms is based upon capital bud-
geting decisions, the ability to operate efficiently and 
please long- term lenders is of critical importance.
The total debt ratio (DebtRat3) is the short- term 
debt and long- term debt added together. Thus, if 
both the short- term debt ratio and long- term debt 
ratios yielded negative coefficients with operating 
expenses, the long- term debt ratio would be a mono-
tonic transformation and produce similar results 
to the two other debt ratios, which are subcompo-
nents of the total. Controlling operating expense is 
an important function to owners and lenders alike. 
Our total debt ratio variable produced both a nega-
tive and highly significant coefficient in the regres-
sion model.
Table 3. Regression Analysis Results (N = 752)
The final regression model is as follows:
 ExpRat = 0.755 – 0.315DebtRat1 – 0.269DebtRat2  
 – 0.213DebtRat3 – 0.081Size + 0.065Fra + ei
Predictor B SE B β t
Constant 0.755 0.032 23.793***
DebtRat1 – 0.315 0.110 – 0.172 – 2.862**
DebrRat2 – 0.269 0.054 – 0.378 – 4.995***
DebtRat3 – 0.213 0.047 – 0.396 – 4.543***
Size – 0.081 0.012 – 0.260 – 6.705***
Fra 0.065 0.031 0.074 2.105*
Eco 0.044 0.036 0..42  1.216
Notes: R2 = 0.52, Adjusted R2 = 0.51
B represents unstandardized coefficients; β represents 
standardized coefficients.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
Table 3 contains the results of the regression analysis. ExpRat is 
the ratio of operating expenses to total revenue. DebtRat1 is the 
ratio of short- term debt to total assets. DebtRat2 is the ratio of 
long- term debt to total assets. DebtRat3 is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Fra is an indicator 
variable with 0 for firms with no franchising and 1 for firms that 
franchise. Eco is an economic condition indicator variable where 
it is 1 if the data was from 2009, 0 otherwise. This variable was 
excluded from the final model due to insignificance. ei is the error 
term of the regression.
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Size is the natural log of total assets and is used in 
the model as a control variable. This is also an inter-
esting result. The coefficient is negatively related to 
the expense ratio and is highly significant. What this 
may indicate is that larger firms are able to achieve 
economies of scale and do a better job of controlling 
operating expenses.
We find a significant and positive relationship 
between franchising and operating expense ratios. 
The assumption of becoming a franchisee is being 
able to increase revenues though brand recognition 
and being part of a national or regional advertising 
program. Another potential benefit of franchising is 
to have access to the experience and knowledge of a 
franchisor in order to understand the business bet-
ter and potentially save on operating costs. On the 
other hand, franchisors often take on franchisees 
in order to gain insight into local markets in which 
they are unfamiliar. Additionally, becoming a fran-
chisee is not costless. Therefore, at least for restau-
rants, becoming a franchisee may have the net effect 
of raising operating expenses.
We also included an indicator variable for eco-
nomic conditions. Specifically, this variable was used 
for the U.S. recession year of 2009. It was unclear 
what the effect of this recession would be on the 
operating expense ratios. Nevertheless, the variable 
was insignificant and removed from the final model.
Implications, Limitations, and Future Research
The current study has both theoretical implications 
and practical implications. This research investi-
gates the notion that debt usage by U.S. restaurant 
companies acts as a monitoring agent of operating 
expenses. This has not been examined in prior stud-
ies of U.S. restaurant firms. Moreover, we consider 
the effects of franchising and economic conditions 
as improvements to the models used by previous 
researchers. Knowing the monitoring role of debt 
could help stakeholders better understand the 
potential of risk and return in the U.S. restaurant 
industry.
However, this research is not without its lim-
itations. First, Compustat does not report all the 
various operating expenses for restaurant firms, 
and they also do not report all operating expenses 
individually. If expenses were ever to be delineated 
individually, it would be interesting to see if debt has 
differing effects on these separate expenses.
Secondly, while our sample size is quite large (752 
observations), the sample includes a wide variety 
of restaurant firms. The restaurant industry is not 
homogeneous. It may prove valuable to separate 
firm types by level of service (i.e., quick service, 
family style, etc.) to understand if there are any dif-
fering effects on the expense ratios from the use of 
different types of debt.
Finally, our results indicate a positive and signif-
icant relationship between franchising and oper-
ating expense ratios. This is a somewhat curious 
finding in that some of the reasons for franchising 
include earning higher revenues or incurring fewer 
expenses. Our sample contains a mix of firms that 
are franchisors as well as companies that exist only 
as franchisees of other firms. It may be fruitful to 
conduct additional research to better understand 
potential differences between these two types of 
firms.
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